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Epaminondas (article not yet completed; needs reworking) Epaminondas, at his height was one of the greatest military tacticians in ancient greek history, he will be forever remembered for being the man responsible for permanently breaking the grip of Spartan haemogeny over the Greek city-states, with his spectacular victory at the Battle of Leutra 371 B.C. He lived his entire life in near-poverty, refusing to enrich himself by taking advantage of his political power. Cornelius Nepos notes his incorruptibility, describing his rejection of a Persian ambassador who came to him with a bribe. In the tradition of the Pythagoreans, he gave freely to his friends and encouraged them to do likewise with each other. These aspects of his character contributed greatly to his renown after his death Little is known about his early life, he was the son of a Theban aristocrat, though they were relatively poor, he did receive a good education. Particularly attracted to philosophy, he became a devoted pupil of Lysis of Tarentum , a Pythagorean, who had settled in Thebes . Epaminondas did not at first take any part in political life but served on military expeditions as a hoplite warrior. His close and enduring friendship with Pelopidas, unbroken over a long series of years, amidst all of their military and civil offices which they held together, strikingly illustrates the sympathy and similarity between the two. Their friendship originated in the campaign in which they served together on the same side as Spartan against Mantineia, where Pelopidas having fallen in a battle, apparently dead, Epaminondas protected his body at the imminent risk of his own life, 385 B.C. In the year 382 B.C. Spartan forces successfully took advantage of an expedition to northern Greece to conspire with a few Thebans for a sudden coup at Thebes. For three and a half years the government was in the hands of this small dictatorship, backed by a Spartan garrison in the Cadmeia (the citadel of Thebes). Many of the Theban leaders, including Pelopidas, were driven into exile. Epaminondas remained at Thebes in no political capacity, but when Pelopidas returned secretly from Athens, he successfully overthrew the dictatorship in 379 and frightened the Spartan garrison into surrender, Epaminondas is said to have been one of those who led the popular uprising in Thebes. No individual part is attributed to him for the next eight years, during which Thebes, in alliance with Athens, successfully fought off Sparta and reestablished its traditional leadership in a federation of the cities of Boeotia. In 371 the general war was ended at a peace conference, but Sparta and Athens combined to refuse recognition of the Theban federation by insisting that each city of Boeotia should be a separate party to the treaty, while Thebes claimed that its federation should be treated as a single unit. Epaminondas, who was boeotarch (one of the five magistrates of the federation), maintained this position, even when it led to the exclusion of Thebes from the peace treaty. The Spartans had an army stationed on Thebes's western frontier, waiting to follow up their diplomatic success by a crushing military attack. At the Battle of Leuctra 371 B.C. Epaminondas was ready with a tactical innovation. Instead of the usual advances of heavily armed infantry drawn up in an equal number of ranks over the whole front, he massed his troops on the left wing to the unprecedented depth of 50 ranks against an overall Spartan depth of 12. The Spartans, who according to Greek convention had their best troops on the right wing, were overwhelmed by the force of the Theban advance. The novelty consisted in striking the enemy first at their strongest, instead of their weakest, point, with such crushing force that the attack was irresistible. The defeat of the Spartans inflicted such heavy losses on the very limited numbers of the Spartan soldiers that it seriously threatened the possibility of raising another Spartan army. The Boeotian federation had been saved, and after more than a year the Theban army, once more led by Epaminondas, proceeded to press home its victory. In the winter (a most unusual season for Greek warfare) of 370–369 they invaded the Peloponnese and penetrated the valley of the Eurotas (modern Evrótas). For the first time for at least two centuries an enemy army was in sight of Sparta. The subject population of Helots revolted, and Epaminondas re-created the state of Messenia, which had been enslaved by the Spartans for 300 years. He also encouraged the Arcadians , who had broken from Sparta's league, to found Megalopolis (Big City) as a federal capital. These new political creations served to keep Sparta in check so that it was never again a serious military power outside the Peloponnese. Epaminondas' brilliant success was met with jealousy and political opposition at home. He had stayed abroad over his year of office and was impeached on his return but acquitted. In 369–368 he led a second successful invasion of the Peloponnese, gaining further allies for Boeotia. In 367 he also served as a common soldier in an army sent to rescue his friend Pelopidas, who was a prisoner of Alexander, tyrant of Pherae (Thessaly). The expedition got into difficulties from which it was only rescued when Epaminondas was appointed general. This resulted in his reelection as boeotarch. He then returned to Thessaly and secured the release of Pelopidas. In 366 he invaded the Peloponnese for a third time, with a view to strengthening the Theban position there. He obtained assurances of fidelity from several states and, perhaps because of these assurances, decided not to overthrow the oligarchical governments that had been established by the Spartans. This was not accepted by the Theban government, which was in favour of overthrowing the oligarchs and establishing new democracies. Athens had supported Sparta and was at war with Thebes. In 364–363 Epaminondas made a bold attempt to challenge Athens' naval empire. With a new Boeotian fleet, he sailed to Byzantium, with the result that a number of cities in the Athenian Empire rebelled against their now-threatened masters. But the next year the outbreak of civil war in the Arcadian league brought Epaminondas once more to the head of a large allied army in the Peloponnese. He was met by Sparta, Athens, and their allies in the Battle of Mantineia (362). Epaminondas repeated on a large scale the tactics of Leuctra and was once more victorious but died of a wound on the field of battle. With his death all constructive initiative appeared to vanish from Theban policy. Herbert William ParkeAdditional ReadingOf ancient sources, Nepos' Epaminondas is vague and moralizing. Plutarch's Life of Epaminondas is lost but can be indirectly approached through his Life of Pelopidas and Pausanias. There is no important single work on the subject by a modern scholar, so it is best studied in the standard general histories. See especially M. Cary in the Cambridge Ancient History, vol. 6, ch. 4 (1927); and N.G.L. Hammond, A History of Greece to 322 BC, 2nd ed., ch. 2–3 and appendix 7 (1967), in which special attention is given to the chronological problems. ~~~~~~~~~`
When the Theban engaged in their enterprise for the recovery of the Cadmeia, in 379 B.C., Epaminondas held aloof from it at first, from a fear, traceable to his Pythagorean religion, lest innocent blood should be shed in the conflict. For the delivery of Thebes from Spartan domination, he was of course favourable. He had exerted himself to raise the spirit and confidence of the Theban youths, urging them to match themselves in gymnastic exercises with the Lacedaemonians of the citadel, and rebuking them, when successful in these, for the tameness of their submission to the invaders; and, when 'the first step in the enterprise had been and Archias and Leontiades were slain, he came forward and took part decisively with Pelopidas and his confederates [3]. In 371 , when the Athenian envoys went to Sparta to negotiate peace, Epaminondas also came, as an ambassador, to look after the interests of Thebes, and distinguished himself by his eloquence and ready wit in the debate which ensued on the question whether Thebes should be allowed to ratify the treaty in the name of all Boeotia, thus obtaining a recognition of her claim to supremacy over the Boeotian towns. This being refused by the Spartans, the Thebans were excluded from the treaty altogether, and Κleombrotus was sent to invade Boeotia. The result was the Βattle of Leuctra, so fatal to the Lacedaemonians, in which the success of Thebes is said to have been owing mainly to the tactics of Epaminondas. Ιt was he, who most strongly urged the giving battle, while he employed all the means in his power to raise the courage of his countrymen, not excluding even omens and oracles, for which, when unfavourable, he had but recently expressed his contempt [4]. The project of Lycomedes for the founding of Megalopolis and the union of Arcadia was vigorously encouraged and forwarded by Epaminondas, 370 B.C., as a barrier against Spartan dominion, though we need not suppose with Pausanias that the plan originated with him [5]. In the next year, 369 B.C., the first invasion of the Peloponnesus by the Thebans took place, and when the rest of their generals were anxious to return home, as the term of their command was drawing to a close, Epaminondas and Pelopidas persuaded them to remain and to advance against Sparta. In the spring of 368 B.C. he again led a Theban army into the Peloponnesus, and having been vainly opposed at the Isthmus by the forces of Sparta and her allies, including Athens, he advanced against Sicyon and Pellene, and obliged them to relinquish their alliance with the Lacedaemonians; but on his return, he was repulsed by Chabrias in an attack which he made on Corinth. It seems doubtful whether his early departure home was owing to the rising jealousy of the Arcadians towards Thebes, or to the arrival of a force, chiefly of Celts and Iberians, sent by Dionysius I. to the aid of the Spartans [8]. In the same year we find him serving, but not as general, in the Theban army which was sent into Thessaly to rescue Pelopidas from Alexander of Pherae, and which Diodorus tells us was saved from utter destruction only by the ability of Epaminondas. According to the same author, he held no command in the expedition, because the Thebans thought he had not pursued as vigorously as he might his advantage over the Spartans at the Isthmus in the last campaign. The disaster in Thessaly, however, proved to Thebes his value, and in the next year (367) he was sent at the head of another force to release Pelopidas, and accomplished his object, according to Plutarch, without even striking a blow, and by the mere prestige of his name [9]. It would appear—and if so, it is a noble testimony to his virtue—that the Thebans took advantage of his absence on this expedition to destroy their old rival Orchomenus,—a design which they had formed immediately after their victory at Leuctra, and which had been then prevented only by his remonstrances [10]. . In the spring of 366 he invaded the Peloponnesus for the third time, with the view chiefly of strengthening the influence of Thebes in Achaia, and so indirectly with the Arcadians as well, who were now more than half alienated from their former ally. Having obtained assurances of fidelity from the chief men in the several states, he did not deem it necessary to put down the oligarchical governments which had been established under Spartan protection; but the Arcadians made this moderation a ground of complaint against him to the Thebans, and the latter then senti harmosts to the different Achaean cities, and set up democracy in all of them, which, however, was soon overthrown everywhere by, a counter-revolution [11]. In 363 B.C., when the oligarchical party in Arcadia had succeeded in bringing about a treaty of peace with Elis, the Theban officer in command at Tegea at first joined in the ratification of it; but afterwards, at the instigation of the chiefs of the democratic party, he ordered the gates of Tegea to be closed, and arrested many of the higher class. The Mantineians protested strongly against this act of violence, and prepared to resent it, and the Theban then released the prisoners, and apologized for his conduct. The Mantineians, however, sent to Thebes to demand that he should be capitally punished; but Epaminondas defended his conduct, saying, that he had acted more properly in arresting the prisoners than in releasing them, and expressed a determination of entering the Peloponnesus to carry on the war in conjunction with those Arcadians who still sided with Thebes [12]. The alarm caused by this answer as symptomatic of an overbearing spirit of aggression on the part of Thebes, (withdrew from her most of the Peloponnesians, though Argos, Messenia, Tegea, and Megalopolis still retained their connexion with her. It was then against a formidable coalition of states, including Athens and Sparta, that Epaminondas invaded the Peloponnesus, for the fourth time, in 362 B.C.. The difficulties of his situation were great, but his energy and genius were fully equal to the crisis, and perhaps at no period of his life were they so remarkably displayed as at its glorious close. Advancing to Tegea, he took up his quarters there; but the time for which he held his command was drawing to an end, and it was necessary for the credit and interest of Thebes that the expedition should not be ineffectual. When then he ascertained that Agesilaus was on his march against him, he set out from Tegea in the evening, and marched straight on Sparta, hoping to find it undefended; but Agesilaus received intelligence of his design, and hastened back before his arrival, and the attempt of the Thebans on the city was baffled. [archidamus III.] They returned accordingly to Tegea, and thence marched on to Mantineia, whither their cavalry had preceded them. In the battle which ensued at this place, and in which the peculiar tactics of Epaminondas were brilliantly and successfully displayed, he himself, in the full career of victory, received a mortal wound, and was borne away from the throng. He was told that his death would follow directly on the javelin being extracted from the wound; but he would not allow this to be done till he had been assured that his shield was safe, and that the victory was with his countrymen. It was a disputed point by whose hand he fell: among others, the honour was assigned to Gryllus, the son of Xenophon. He was buried where he died, and his tomb was surmounted by a column, on which a shield was suspended, emblazoned with the device of a dragon—symbolical (says Pausanias) of his descent from the blood of the Σπαρτοι, the children of the dragon's teeth [13]. The circumstances of ancient Greece supplied little or no scope for any but the narrowest patriotism, and this evil is perhaps never more apparent than when we think of it in connexion with the noble mind of one like Epaininondas. We do indeed find him rising above it, as, for instance, in .his preservation of Orchomenus; but this was in spite of the system under which he lived, and which, while it checked throughout the full expansion of his character, sometimes (as in his vindication of the outrage at Tegea) seduced him into positive injustice. At the best, amidst all our admiration of his genius and his many splendid qualities, we cannot forget that they were directed, after all, to the one petty object of the aggrandizement of Thebes. In the ordinary characters of Grecian history we look for no more than this ;— it comes before us painfully in the case of Epaminondas [14]. References:
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